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Trends in Unemployment 
Benefit Financing
Mike Miller
UI Service, U.S Department of Labor
Robert Pavosevich
U I Service, U.S. Department of Labor
Wayne Vroman
Urban Institute
State unemployment insurance (UI) programs in the middle of the 
1990s have aggregate trust fund balances totaling more than $30 bil 
lion. Most state UI programs passed through the 1990-1992 recession 
ary period without needing to borrow from the U.S. Treasury. This 
stands in sharp contrast to the recessions of 1973-1975, 1980, and 
1981-1982, when borrowing was widespread and large-scale and 
indebtedness extended over multi-year periods.
This chapter reviews the history of UI trust fund financing with par 
ticular attention to recent developments. It is divided into six main sec 
tions. The first provides a long-run overview of UI trust fund reserves 
from the program's inception through the mid-1990s. The next section 
reviews the history of borrowing and loan repayments with particular 
attention to changes caused by revised debt repayment provisions of 
the early 1980s. Without attempting to be definitive, this part also dis 
cusses the question of trust fund adequacy and some common mea 
sures of trust fund adequacy. The third section introduces the topic of 
flexible financing as a benefit funding strategy. Individual elements of 
flexible financing are identified and their growth and prevalence are 
described. The fourth section undertakes several investigations of flexi 
ble financing. These help in an assessment of its overall quantitative
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importance. The fifth section discusses policy implications of flexible 
financing, and the final section provides a summary and conclusions. 
The main conclusions of the chapter can be stated quite simply.
1. The state UI trust funds are now more healthy than at the end of 
the 1970s and start of the early 1980s, but not so large that the 
risks of insolvency and debt are merely matters of historical inter 
est. The fact that borrowing during 1990-1994 was so modest is 
partly attributable to the mild nature of the recession.
2. There is a continuing need for states to maintain reserves to avert 
large-scale borrowing during a future recession. We note and 
express concern for the comparatively modest pace of trust fund 
rebuilding during 1993-1994. It appears likely that reserves avail 
able for the next recession will be less adequate than they were 
prior to the 1990-1992 recession.
3. While flexible financing provisions are now more prevalent in UI, 
we were not able to demonstrate an increased quantitative impor 
tance of such provisions compared to the situation, for example, 
twenty years ago.
4. The speed and strength of automatic financing responses built into 
current UI statutes appear inadequate to the needs that would 
arise in a future downturn if its depth and severity equaled the 
average of the eight post-World War II recessions.
Trends in Aggregate Unemployment Insurance Reserves
Following the establishment of state UI programs in 1937, the his 
tory of aggregate trust fund reserves falls into three distinct periods. 
Sustained and large accumulations occurred during the earliest years. 
This was caused by two factors: lower benefit costs than originally 
anticipated and the effects of full employment during World War II. As 
a fraction of covered payrolls, aggregate reserves reached their all-time 
peak at the end of 1945 (10.4 percent). Modest absolute growth in
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reserves continued through the end of 1948, when the $7.60 billion 
total represented 7.91 percent of covered payrolls.
These years of trust fund accumulations clearly were helped by the 
strong macroeconomic environment associated with World War II. 
Aggregate benefit payments, which had averaged about 1.5 percent of 
covered payrolls during 1938-1940, averaged only about 0.5 percent of 
payrolls during 1941-1945, with payout rates especially low during 
1943 and 1944. Despite large reductions in average tax rates (from 
2.69 percent of payrolls in 1938 to 1.50 percent in 1945), tax revenues 
exceeded benefits in every year through 1945.
The early years of the program also witnessed changes that effec 
tively increased the average duration of benefits. In the initial years of 
UI, nearly all states imposed a two- or three-week waiting period and 
limited the maximum benefit duration to 15 or 16 weeks. 1 These limi 
tations were premised on actuarial expectations that benefit payouts 
would average 3 percent of payrolls. In fact, actual payout rates during 
this period were much lower, especially during World War II. As expe 
riences with low payout rates persisted, states modified their laws to 
shorten the waiting period and to lengthen maximum duration. These 
changes occurred mainly in the 1940s and 1950s.
During the thirty-two years from 1948 to 1979, growth in UI trust 
fund reserves lagged substantially behind the growth in the economy. 
Table 9.1 helps illustrate this situation, showing aggregate net reserves, 
covered payrolls, and net reserves as a percentage of payrolls (com 
monly termed the reserve ratio) for selected years. 2 Of the nine individ 
ual years displayed in the table the first eight represent prerecession 
years for the individual post-World War II recessions, with the back-to- 
back recessions of 1980-1983 and 1990-1992 treated as single epi 
sodes. The most interesting feature of the 1948-1979 period is the con 
tinuous decline in aggregate reserves measured as a percentage of 
payrolls, from 7.91 percent in 1948 to 0.91 percent in 1979. Even dur 
ing the long continuous expansion of the 1960s, when aggregate 
reserves nearly doubled, growing from $6.67 billion to $12.64 billion, 
there was a small decline in net reserves relative to total payrolls.
Since state trust funds were so large at the start of the 1948-1979 
period, the decline in reserves did not present financing problems for 
many states until the mid-1970s. Alaska, Michigan, and Pennsylvania
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were the only states that obtained loans to finance benefits during the 
1950s and 1960s. All of these loans were fully repaid by the late 1960s.














































SOURCE Data from the U S Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service Data on 
reserves measured in billions of dollars Data refer to all fifty-three programs. Payroll data for 
1994 are preliminary
Substantial drawdowns of state trust funds occurred in the early 
1970s. The first states to require loans were Connecticut, Vermont, and 
Washington during 1972-1974, with reductions in defense-related pro 
curement causing especially high unemployment in both Connecticut 
and Washington during 1970-1972.
Large-scale borrowing from the U.S. Treasury first became wide 
spread in 1975 as the 1974-1975 recession caused financing problems 
for many states. Nearly half of all UI programs required loans during 
1975-1978, and total borrowing exceeded $5.0 billion. Furthermore, 
the post-1975 recovery was not sufficiently robust to fully restore trust 
fund balances by the end of the 1970s. Note in table 9.1 that net 
reserves at the end of 1979 totaled only $8.58 billion, about $2.3 bil 
lion less than at the end of 1973. The reserve ratio at the end of 1979 
was only 0.91 percent, roughly one-fourth of the reserve ratio at the 
end of 1969, and the lowest prerecession reserve ratio shown in Table 
9.1.
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Because state programs entered the 1980-1983 recessionary period 
with historically low reserves, borrowing was even more widespread 
and of larger scale during the early 1980s than in the previous decade. 
Table 9.1 shows that substantial net trust fund accumulations occurred 
between 1979 and 1989. This ten-year interval is appropriately divided 
into an initial four years of recession (1980-1983) followed by six 
years of substantial trust fund building. Net reserves were actually neg 
ative at the end of 1983 (-$5.8 billion, not shown in table 9.1) so that 
the 1984-1989 period had a total accumulation of more than $42 bil 
lion.
Despite the reserve buildup of 1984-1989, note in table 9.1 that the 
1989 net reserve balance of $36.87 billion represented only 1.92 per 
cent of covered payrolls. As a fraction of covered payrolls this level 
was only slightly more than half the levels of 1959 and 1969 and some 
what smaller than the balance at the end of 1973. Despite net reserves 
being relatively lower in 1989 than in 1973, state borrowing during the 
most recent recession was much smaller than during the mid-1970s. A 
discussion of the contrasting pattern of borrowing in the two periods is 
reserved for the next section.
The final aspect of table 9.1 to note is the aggregate reserve position 
of the states at the end of 1994. Net reserves of $31.34 billion repre 
sented 1.32 percent of covered payrolls, roughly midway between the 
reserve levels of 1979 and 1989 when measured as a percent of covered 
payrolls. The $31.34 billion represents an increase of $5.50 billion in 
net reserves from two years earlier, the low point of the most recent 
recession. It should be noted that the $2.75 billion annual rate of trust 
fund accumulations during 1993 and 1994 stands in contrast to an 
annual accumulation rate that averaged $7.0 billion during 1984-1989. 
If one were to speculate on the net reserve position of the states at the 
start of the next recession, it would appear that reserves will be smaller 
relative to covered payrolls than they were prior to the 1990-1992 
recession.
To summarize, the history of aggregate net reserves since the incep 
tion of unemployment insurance falls into three periods: (1) 1937- 
1948—substantial reserve accumulations; (2) 1948-1979—substantial 
losses of reserve adequacy; and (3) 1979 to the present—trust fund 
building, although the high point of the period (1989) did not reach the 
level of 1973. Furthermore, based on data from 1993 and 1994, recent
370 Trends in Unemployment Benefit Financing
reserve accumulations have occurred at a substantially slower pace 
than during the 1984-1989 period. This has obvious implications for 
potential borrowing by the states during the next recession.
A Brief History of State Borrowing
Funding Concepts
Revenues that fund regular state UI programs are obtained mainly 
from payroll taxes on covered employers. Tax receipts are deposited 
into state UI trust fund accounts maintained at the U.S. Treasury. These 
accounts are the so'urce for benefit payments to eligible claimants.
The funding strategy for regular UI is usually characterized as pre- 
funding (or advance funding or forward funding). Trust fund balances 
are built up prior to recessions, drawn down during recessions, and 
then rebuilt during the subsequent recoveries. This funding arrange 
ment means that the program acts as an automatic stabilizer of eco 
nomic activity, i.e., it makes larger injections than withdrawals into the 
spending streams during recessions and larger withdrawals than injec 
tions during economic recoveries. The preceding characterization was 
less accurate during the recessions of the mid-1970s and the early 
1980s because the trust fund balances were not adequate to pay regular 
UI benefits to all claimants. Large-scale and persistent state borrowing 
took place.
During the most recent downturn, state UI trust funds were gener 
ally adequate to meet demands for benefit payments. For the five full 
years of 1990 to 1994, only seven states required loans from the Fed 
eral Unemployment Account (FUA), the federal trust fund loan 
account, and only two states (Connecticut and Massachusetts) engaged 
in "large-scale" borrowing. 3 As noted, this recent situation stands in 
sharp contrast to the recessions of 1974-1975 and 1980-1983. In both 
earlier periods, borrowing was much more widespread and larger in 
relative scale.
To place 1990-1994 trust fund borrowing experiences into more of a 
historical perspective, table 9.2 provides summary data that extend 
back over the 1970s and 1980s. The top panel in table 9.2 summarizes
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Initial HCMs
States with loans






















SOURCE Data from the U S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service. Data exclude the Virgin Islands. Large loans are defined as total 
borrowing over the indicated periods equal to 1 percent or more of total payrolls for a single year, 1975, 1984, and 1991, respectively
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state UI trust fund reserve balances at the end of four separate years: 
1969,1973,1979, and 1989. These four dates were selected (as in table 
9.1) because they precede the onset of recessions and recession-related 
increases in the demand for UI benefit payments.
The information summarized in table 9.2 involves the concept of the 
high-cost multiple (HCM), also known as the reserve ratio multiple. 
This is a UI actuarial concept that assesses state reserve adequacy by 
taking into consideration three important factors pertinent to the state: 
the balance in its UI trust fund, the scale of its economy, and its own 
past experiences in paying UI benefits. The denominator in the HCM is 
the highest cost benefit payout period in the state's history. This is total 
benefit payout over a twelve-month period expressed as a percentage 
of covered wages for the same period. The interstate range of high-cost 
percentages extends from a low of 1.04 percent (in South Dakota 
between January and December 1964) to a high of 4.37 percent (in 
Rhode Island between January and December 1975). The highest cost 
period for the U.S. as a whole was 2.24 percent (between January and 
December 1975).
The numerator of the HCM, the reserve ratio, is the end-of-year trust 
fund balance divided by covered wages for the year and expressed as a 
percentage.4 The ratio of these two ratios, the HCM, is thus a measure 
whose numerator incorporates information on both the UI trust fund 
balance and the on scale of the state's economy (as approximated by 
covered wages) while the denominator is a measure of risk, the highest 
previous twelve-month payout rate.
In the past, some have advocated that states build trust fund reserves 
to levels that produce an HCM of 1.5. This level implies that the fund 
balance would equal eighteen months of benefits if paid out at the his 
torically highest payout rate. As a measure of trust fund adequacy, the 
HCM has its critics. Many practitioners feel that the 1.5 HCM is too 
conservative as a standard, i.e., that a prudent state could function with 
a much lower trust fund balance with little or no risk of fund insol 
vency.5
While trust fund financing has been practiced since the inception of 
UI, there is no consensus over the appropriate measure of trust fund 
adequacy. The recently disbanded Advisory Council on Unemploy 
ment Compensation (ACUC) examined funding issues in its February 
1995 Report. 6 Chapter 5 of the report analyzed the funding situation of
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the states as of the end of 1993 under three alternative potential sol 
vency standards. Table 5.3 in the report shows the number of states 
meeting HCM solvency standards ranging from 0.25 to 1.75 using 
seven measures of high costs: one involving the highest twelve-month 
costs ever experienced, three involving the highest twelve-month cost 
periods over the past ten years and three involving the highest twelve 
month cost periods over the past twenty years.
The ACUC recommended that states meet an HCM standard of 1.0, 
where the state's high cost rate is measured as the average of the three 
highest-cost twelve-month periods over the past twenty years. The 
ACUC also recommended that the federal partner provide four specific 
financial incentives to the states to meet forward funding goals, e.g., 
preferential interest rates for achieving large balances and lower inter 
est rates on recession-related borrowing if prerecession balances 
equaled or exceeded solvency standards. 7 The ACUC's financing rec 
ommendations, if instituted, would improve the solvency of many state 
UI programs.
Summary of State Borrowing
Because UI trust fund balances were so large during the initial post- 
World War II decades, there was a very limited need for state borrow 
ing from the U.S. Treasury. As noted, just three states, Alaska, Michi 
gan and Pennsylvania, required loans before 1970, and only Alaska 
actually used its loans to pay benefits. These loans were secured 
mainly during 1958 and 1959, and repayments were completed during 
1967 and 1968.
The post-1970 experiences have been much different. The top panel 
of table 9.2 displays the distribution of HCMs prior to the four most 
recent economic downturns. 8 Each row shows multiples for fifty-two 
UI programs (all except the Virgin Islands). The final entry for each 
row is the national HCM. From this last column as well as from the 
distributions of state multiples, it is clear that reserves were most 
ample at the end of 1969 and lowest at the end of 1979. Between 1979 
and 1989, most states increased reserves substantially, and the national 
high-cost multiple roughly doubled, increasing from 0.41 to 0.87.
The lower three panels in table 9.2 then summarize state borrowing 
experiences in the three most recent downturns. Each panel shows how
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many states needed loans and how many needed "large" loans, i.e., 
loans that totaled 1.0 percent or more of covered payrolls. The twenty- 
four states that needed loans during 1974-1979 borrowed a total of 
$5.5 billion. Between 1980 and 1987, a total of $24.0 billion was bor 
rowed by thirty-one programs. In contrast, borrowing by seven states 
during 1990-1994 totaled only $4.4 billion, less in absolute value than 
during 1974-1979. The comparative scale of borrowing during the 
three recessionary episodes is vividly illustrated when total loans are 
expressed as a percentage of payrolls for one year during each period: 
0.95 percent during 1974-1979, 1.75 percent during 1980-1987, but 
only 0.21 percent during 1990-1994.9 Table 9.2 also shows the number 
of states needing large loans during the three episodes. These respec 
tive counts are fifteen, fourteen and two.
The purpose of prefunding (or advance funding) UI programs is to 
have adequate reserves in the state trust funds to make benefit pay 
ments during recessions without resorting to borrowing (or at least 
large-scale borrowing). By ranking states according to their HCMs, the 
bottom panels of table 9.2 provide a convenient summary of the preva 
lence of borrowing according to an indicator of prerecession reserve 
adequacy. In each episode, borrowing and large-scale borrowing were 
most prevalent among states with low prerecession fund balances. 
States with HCMs of 1.0 or larger generally have been successful at 
avoiding borrowing. Conversely, those with multiples below 0.5 have 
been most likely to need loans and to need large loans.
Table 9.2 also illustrates that the 1.5 HCM guideline is not a fool 
proof indicator of reserve adequacy. There have been states that 
entered recessions with multiples above 1.5 that subsequently needed 
loans. Conversely, not all states with prerecession multiples below 0.5 
have needed loans. However, for identifying states at risk of needing 
loans and of needing large loans, the HCM is a useful indicator. 10
An interesting contrast emerges when borrowing during the 1980- 
1987 and 1990-1994 periods is compared. For HCMs in the 0.0 to 0.5 
and 0.5 to 1.0 ranges, note that the proportions that borrowed were 
much lower during 1990-1994 than during 1980-1987. In addition, the 
proportions needing large loans were also much lower during 1990- 
1994." One important reason for reduced borrowing activity among 
states with comparable prerecession HCMs was the relative mildness
Unemployment Insurance in the United States 375
of the recent downturn when compared to the back-to-back recessions 
of the early 1980s.
Borrowing Provisions
State UI programs are required to make timely payments to eligible 
claimants regardless of current balances in their trust fund accounts 
held at the U.S. Treasury. If state reserve balances are inadequate there 
are statutory provisions for borrowing from the Treasury. These provi 
sions, in Title XII of the Social Security Act, are important to review.
Treasury loans for purposes of making benefit payments are avail 
able to states on essentially an as-needed basis. Interest charges accrue 
if advances are still outstanding after certain mandatory repayment 
dates. These are levied at the interest rate applicable to medium-term 
U.S. debt but are capped at 10.0 percent. Interest accrues on the aver 
age daily indebtedness. States that borrow after January 1 of a given 
year can avoid interest charges altogether if loans are fully repaid by 
September 30 of the same year. Loans taken and fully repaid in the 
same fiscal year are commonly referred to as cash-flow loans. 12
The states also face debt repayment requirements under Title XII. If 
debt has been outstanding on January 1st of two consecutive years and 
has not been fully repaid by November 10th of the latter year, an auto 
matic debt repayment process is activated. On January 1 of the follow 
ing year, 0.3 percent is added to the federal part of each employer's UI 
tax obligation under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) tax: 
i.e., 1.1 percent is levied rather than 0.8 percent on the first $7,000 of 
earnings for each employee. The proceeds of the 0.3 percent penalty 
tax go toward repaying the oldest part of the state's debt. Higher pen 
alty tax rates apply in later years.
Because FUTA penalty taxes are levied at a single flat rate, a state 
may prefer to make voluntary repayments of experience- rated state UI 
taxes. These must be levied as new tax obligations (not withdrawals 
from the state's UI trust fund), and their yield must at least equal the 
yield of the federal penalty tax. Voluntary repayment can also be 
accomplished by a special assessment levied on top of regular 
employer state UI taxes.
Prior to 1982, debt repayment provisions differed from current pro 
visions in several ways. Two especially important contrasts should be
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noted: (1) loans did not carry interest charges, and (2) automatic debt 
repayment through mandatory FUTA penalty taxes was suspended by 
emergency federal legislation. In short, debt burdens before 1982 were 
lighter.
The increase in the cost of indebtedness has affected state attitudes 
towards debt, as shown by their debt repayment behavior. 13 Debts 
incurred in the late 1970s were repaid slowly, whereas post-1982 debts 
were repaid rapidly. Post-1982 debts have often been held for such 
short periods that no interest has been due.
Tables 9.3A and 9.3B summarize national details on loans, debt and 
debt repayments from 1972 to 1994. Interest-free and interest-bearing 
debts are distinguished, with the changeover to interest-bearing 
advances taking place on April 1, 1982. Note in table 9.3A that bor 
rowing during the 1990s never exceeded $1.5 billion per year.
Probably the most interesting feature of table 9.3B is the contrast in 
loan repayment patterns for the two types of loans. Of the $10.48 bil 
lion of interest-free loans, $6.44 billion (over 60 percent of the total) 
was repaid as FUTA penalty taxes (credit reductions). In contrast, the 
fraction was only 1.2 percent ($0.29 billion) for the interest-bearing 
advances repaid in this manner with the rest made as voluntary repay 
ments. The vivid contrast in repayment patterns is also indicated by the 
annual repayment rates for the two types of debt. The all-year weighted 
averages of the two repayment rates are 14 percent for interest-free 
debt and 56 percent for interest-bearing debt.
The fast pace of debt repayment, apparent from 1983, has also char 
acterized the loans of the 1990s. Under current debt repayment provi 
sions, debtor states have demonstrated strong sensitivity to interest 
charges, and the prospect of these charges has led to faster corrective 
actions by the states.
Changes in state-level patterns of borrowing and loan repayment 
mean that debts are now held for shorter periods. 14 However, part of the 
explanation for shorter periods of indebtedness is an increased willing 
ness of states with financing problems to reduce UI benefits even 
before the economy has recovered from a recession. 15 This greater 
inclination dates from the early 1980s. Both macro and income distri 
bution considerations suggest this timing of benefit reductions is not 
appropriate.
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Table 9.3A Summary of State UI Debt and Debt Repayment Activities, 
1972 to 1994 ($ billions)


















































































































































































SOURCE- Based on data from the U S 
NA = not applicable.
Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service.
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Table 9.3B Summary of State UI Debt and Debt Repayment Activities, 
1972 to 1994 ($ billions)













































































































































































































SOURCE- See table 9 3A NA = not applicable
a Voluntary repayments accounted for all but $0.29 billion of interest-bearing loan repayments, 
b Annual repayment rates measured as repayments divided by the sum of debt at the start of the 
year plus loans received during the year. All-year averages are weighted averages of annual repay 
ment rates, where weights are annual loans plus annual start-of-year debt.
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State Trust Funds, Borrowing, and Unemployment during 1990-1994
State-level information on UI trust fund reserves and unemployment 
for 1990-1992 is displayed in table 9.4A. For each of the fifty-three UI 
programs, the table shows reserves and HCMs at the end of 1989 and 
1992 and three-year changes. Also included is a measure of recession- 
related unemployment growth, i.e., each state's 1990-1992 unemploy 
ment rate is shown as a ratio to its 1987-1989 unemployment rate.
Note the national aggregates at the bottom of table 9.4A. Total net 
reserves declined by about $11 billion over these three years, and the 
national HCM decreased by about one-third, from 0.87 to 0.56. At the 
end of 1992, however, only four states had negative net reserves.
Observe the large drawdowns of reserves in California and New 
York, both exceeding $2.5 billion, and the losses in Massachusetts, 
Connecticut and Pennsylvania. Combined, these five states accounted 
for $8.6 billion of reserve losses or 78 percent of the national total. 16 
One indicator of the comparative shallowness of the 1990-1992 down 
turn is the national unemployment rate ratio of 1.156, i.e., the national 
unemployment rate during 1990-1992 was only 15.6 percent higher 
than the 1987-1989 prerecession average.
The state-level information can be organized in alternative ways to 
illustrate different points about recent trust fund reserve losses. Table 
9.4A arrays the states according to the level of their 1989 HCMs. Dur 
ing 1991 and 1992, four UI programs borrowed from the FUA: Michi 
gan, Connecticut, the District of Columbia and Massachusetts. 
Arranging the 1989 state HCMs in ascending order as in table 9.4A, 
these states ranked 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 8th, respectively. The three other 
states needing loans during the 1991-1994 period (Missouri, New 
York, and Maine) ranked 10th, 21st, and 29th, respectively, in table 
9.4A. Thus, while borrowing was related to initial reserve balances, it 
had other determinants as well. 17
One informative way to examine the loss of reserves during 1990- 
1992 is to note changes in state-level unemployment rates. Table 9.4B 
rearranges the information from table 9.4A to emphasize recession- 
related increases in state unemployment. The largest proportional 
increase in state-level unemployment occurred in New Hampshire, 
where the 1990-1992 average rate was 6.80 percent while the 1987- 
1989 average was 2.83 percent, yielding a ratio of 2.400. States are
Table 9.4A Summary of Net Reserves by State, December 1989 and December 1992 
(States Arrayed by 1989 High-Cost Multiples)










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NA = not applicable
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arrayed in descending order of their unemployment rate ratios in table 
9.4B.
A striking feature of the table is the geographic concentration of the 
increases in unemployment. As noted, the national average increase for 
1990-1992 relative to 1987-1989 was 15.6 percent or a ratio of 1.156. 
There are sixteen states whose unemployment rate ratios exceed the 
national average. Fifteen of these are located along the eastern sea 
board of the United States, and the sixteenth is California. 18
The most dramatic increases in unemployment occurred in New 
England, whose constituent states occupy the five top rows and the 
eighth row in table 9.4B. All three Middle Atlantic states had above- 
average increases, with ratios of 1.664, 1.476 and 1.297 in New Jersey, 
New York and Pennsylvania, respectively. Of the nine states in the 
South Atlantic division, six also experienced above-average increases, 
while a seventh (South Carolina) roughly matched the national aver 
age. Thus, Georgia and West Virginia were the only South Atlantic 
states not to experience a major increase in unemployment during 
1990-1992.
Note also in table 9.4B that nineteen states actually had lower aver 
age unemployment rates during 1990-1992 than in 1987- 1989. An 
additional twelve states with higher unemployment during 1990-1992 
experienced increases that were less than half the national average 
increase, i.e., their ratios lie between 1.000 and 1.078. Thus, for thirty- 
one of fifty-one states, unemployment rates either declined during 
1990-1992 or increased only moderately. This "fact" provides much of 
the explanation for the limited borrowing by state UI programs during 
the 1990-1992 downturn.
Yet another perspective on trust fund reserve adequacy and reserve 
losses during 1990-1992 is provided in table 9.4C. Here the state-level 
information has been arranged to focus on reductions in HCMs 
between 1989 and 1992. Maine led the nation with a reduction in its 
multiple of 0.79. The multiples in thirteen states decreased by 0.40 or 
more, and nine of the thirteen are located along the Atlantic coast. 19 As 
with the increases in unemployment, the decreases in reserves were 
concentrated mainly along the eastern seaboard.
Table 9.4C is also useful for showing the full range of reductions in 
state HCMs during 1990-1992.20 Not one of the reductions equaled or 
exceeded -1.0, and only five equaled or exceeded -0.60. The five states
Table 9.4B Summary of Net Reserves by State, December 1989 and December 1992 
(States Arrayed by Unemployment Rate Ratios)










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NA = not applicable
Table 9.4C Summary of Net Reserves by State, December 1989 and December 1992 
(States Arrayed by Changes in High-Cost Multiples)










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NA = not applicable
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at the top of table 9.4C are particularly relevant because each state 
experienced a major increase in unemployment. The lowest unemploy 
ment rate ratio for these five states was 1.476 for New York. Observe 
that fifteen programs actually had HCMs at the end of 1992 than at the 
end of 1989, a unique development during a recessionary period and 
largely attributable to the shallowness of the recession.
To help place the 1990-1992 downturn into a greater perspective, 
table 9.5 displays state-level summary information for the four most 
recent recessions. The top half of the table focuses on increases in 
unemployment while the bottom half summarizes reductions in HCMs.
The most important inference to be drawn from the table is very 
simple: the 1990-1992 downturn was mild relative to the previous three 
downturns. Consider first the increases in state unemployment rates. Of 
the fifty states and the District of Columbia, the number with ratios of 
1.25 or larger were as follows: 1971-1973 (thirty-seven), 1974-1976 
(thirty-two), 1981-1983 (thirty-six), and 1990-1992 (sixteen). Both 
summary measures at the end of each line (the state median and the 
U.S. total) convey the same message: the 1990-1992 downturn was 
comparatively mild in terms of the increase in the average unemploy 
ment rate.
Turning to the reductions in HCMs shown at the bottom of table 9.5, 
the same point emerges. The numbers of states whose multiples 
decreased by 0.5 or more were as follows: 1969-1973 (thirty-four), 
1973-1976 (forty-four), 1979-1983 (twenty-five), and 1989-1992 
(eight). Finally, the state medians and U.S. totals at the ends of these 
four bottom lines reemphasize the small reductions in HCMs during 
1989-1992. 21
From the information in table 9.5, one main conclusion emerges: the 
increases in unemployment and losses of trust fund reserves were 
unusually small during the most recent recession. Also contributing to 
the modest amount of state borrowing during 1990-1994 were the 
comparatively high levels of reserves present in many states prior to 
the downturn.
One additional factor linked to emergency UI benefits contributed to 
the low level of state borrowing during 1990-1994. The Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program paid benefits to large 
numbers of claimants from late 1991 through early 1994. 22 This pro 
gram compensating regular UI exhaustees was fully federally financed.
Table 9.5 Recession-Related Changes in Unemployment and UI Trust Fund Reserves














































































































SOURCE: Calculations performed at the Urban Institute using data from the U.S Department of Labor State unemployment rate estimates prior to 1976 
for several small states made at the Urban Institute Calculations are shown for the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
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However, after August 1992 there was a feature of EUC, known as 
optional EUC, which allowed claimants to utilize their EUC base 
period if it yielded a larger weekly benefit than the base period preced 
ing their more current spell of unemployment. Thus, new claimants for 
state- financed regular UI were able to collect added weeks of feder 
ally-financed EUC even though they experienced substantial interven 
ing periods of employment. Furthermore, the utilization of these EUC 
benefits did not preclude receipt of any regular UI benefits (based on 
the later base period) after exhausting EUC. In effect, the U.S. Trea 
sury paid some weeks of what otherwise would have been state- 
financed regular UI benefits.
While EUC was operating it paid total benefits of $27.9 billion. 
State reporting of EUC captured only one element of optional EUC, 
the number of initial claims, which totaled 12.6 percent of all EUC ini 
tial claims. It is almost certain that optional EUC benefits were 
received for shorter periods than other EUC benefits. To estimate the 
savings to state UI trust funds, an algorithm was developed to project 
weeks compensated and benefits for optional EUC claims at the 
national level. The algorithm was then applied to state-level data on 
optional EUC initial claims to estimate state-level payouts. Because 
identical durations for the two groups of EUC claimants were assumed, 
the algorithm probably exaggerates payouts under optional EUC. 
Nationwide, optional EUC was estimated to total $3.12 billion. How 
ever, assuming these amounts reduced state reserves dollar for dollar 
and assuming no response of experience-rated taxes, only $0.475 bil 
lion in added state borrowing was projected during 1992-1994 had 
optional EUC not been available. Interestingly, all of the added bor 
rowing estimated by the model was concentrated in the seven states 
that did borrow from the U.S. Treasury, i.e., no other states would have 
borrowed in the absence of optional EUC benefits.
Thus, without optional EUC, we estimate that seven states would 
have borrowed a total of $4.89 billion (rather than $4.42 billion) and 
that the aggregate state UI trust fund balances at the end of 1994 would 
have been $28.21 billion (rather than $31.34 billion). As a factor 
explaining the low level of state borrowing during 1990-1994, optional 
EUC was not important.
A final detail regarding loan repayments during 1991-1994 should 
be noted. In August-September 1993 Connecticut repaid $0.818 billion
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of Title XII advances using the proceeds of state-issued bonds, the 
major part of a bond issuance that totaled $1.0 billion. These bonds are 
scheduled to be fully repaid by 2002. The first of fourteen scheduled 
semiannual repayments occurred in February 1995, so that very little 
of this state-issued debt has been repaid. 23 Thus, for Connecticut, most 
of the state UI debt might be appropriately counted as still outstanding.
To summarize, the low amount of state borrowing during 1990- 
1994 can be attributed to two major factors: (1) more adequate trust 
fund balances at the end of 1989 compared to 1979, and (2) the mild 
nature of the recession across most of the country. Optional EUC was 
not an important factor explaining the low level of borrowing.
One other concluding observation from this section is to note the 
low annual rates of trust fund rebuilding during 1993 and 1994. It 
appears that states will have less adequate reserves (as suggested by 
solvency indicators such as HCMs) when they enter the next recession 
than they did prior to the 1990-1992 downturn.
Perhaps states currently require fewer reserves than in the past 
because their financing systems are now much more responsive to trust 
fund drawdowns. The historical descriptions from this section did not 
try to assess the quantitative importance of so-called flexible financing 
features or their growth in recent years. The next two sections address 
this important topic.
Flexible Financing Provisions
The key factors that make UI benefit financing a complex and 
important issue are that benefit outlays are highly sensitive to the busi 
ness cycle and that the timing and severity of cyclical downturns are 
difficult to predict. Each state must develop a funding strategy to deal 
with these elements. In the early years of the UI program, as demon 
strated in the first section, the focus of financing strategy was on build 
ing up sufficient reserves to handle a worst-case recession, using the 
HCM or similar measure as a benchmark. However, over the years it 
has been increasingly recognized that determining the appropriate level 
of reserves is more complex than just looking at potential future out 
lays. A state must also assess the responsiveness of its tax system to
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changes in benefit outlays and fund balance, as well as take into 
account the level of borrowing risk that is deemed acceptable. The 
more responsive the tax system, the lower the reserve level required for 
a state's needs. Likewise, the greater the acceptable risk of borrowing, 
the lower the adequate reserve level. From a pure fund adequacy per 
spective, as opposed to other goals of the UI system, it is recognized 
that having a low fund balance coupled with a responsive tax system is 
a legitimate strategy.
Tax responsiveness refers to the level and speed of the automatic 
response to benefit increases built into state UI tax systems. This auto 
matic response occurs in two ways. First, experience-rating systems 
assign tax rates to individual employers based on some measure of 
experience with unemployment, usually related to the amount of UI 
benefits paid. As benefit costs rise, average tax rates also rise. Second, 
every state has some triggering mechanism whereby a declining fund 
balance leads to higher tax rates for all firms, either through multiple 
rate schedules or surcharges or both. Beyond taxes, some states also 
have mechanisms that tie benefit restrictions to low threshold levels of 
trust fund balances. The combination of tax and benefit features auto 
matically triggered by the condition of the trust fund is sometimes 
referred to as flexible financing.
The origins and evolution of flexible financing in the individual 
states reflect varied historical developments. In some states, ad hoc 
arrangements were created during periods of trust fund inadequacy and 
were intended as temporary fixes. Others have implemented flexible 
financing as permanent changes. At least two states, Illinois and Penn 
sylvania, overhauled their tax and benefit statutes in the late 1980s with 
the intention of reducing the average trust fund balance over the busi 
ness cycle and adding flexibility features. Recession-related draw 
downs would be countered by automatic tax increases and benefit 
reductions as the fund balance descended past certain thresholds 
towards zero. We have not attempted to follow the individual motiva 
tions leading to state actions but have tried to document the changing 
prevalence of flexibility features.
Despite the awareness of flexible financing as a component of a 
funding strategy, little has been written about the determinants of flexi 
ble financing and there has been even less quantitative analysis. These 
topics are the focus here and in the following sections.
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There is a general perception that states have increased their reliance 
on flexible financing over time, especially since 1980. Several events 
occurred in the early 1980s that may have caused this. First, during the 
back-to-back recessions of 1980-1983, thirty-one states borrowed from 
the federal loan account to pay benefits. Second, federal loan policy 
became significantly tighter, as previously discussed. Deferrals of 
FUTA credit reductions (for loan repayment) were eliminated in 1980 
and the interest-free feature (except on a very short-term basis) of the 
loan system was eliminated in 1982. At the same time that borrowing 
has become a less attractive option for states, there has been a growing 
recognition that carrying large trust fund balances may have undesir 
able effects. As a result, states have an incentive to make their tax sys 
tems more responsive.
This section discusses features that make a system more responsive 
and examines changes made by states since 1980. We also compare 
and contrast a responsive and a nonresponsive state. The next section 
undertakes some quantitative analysis of responsiveness and tries to 
determine whether or not responsiveness has increased in the last 
decade or so. Also, the results of a simulation analysis of the flexible 
financing system in Pennsylvania are reported. The subsequent discus 
sion addresses some pros and cons and policy issues associated with 
flexible financing.
Flexibility Features and Trends
Since 1980, although they have often acted hesitantly, many state 
legislatures faced with problems of insolvency in their UI trust fund 
accounts have moved to increase the responsiveness of their UI sys 
tems. They have enacted legislation meant to increase UI taxes and to 
lower UI benefits during recessionary periods. These states are, in 
effect, making up for the lack of forward funding in their systems by 
working to avoid insolvency at low levels of trust fund reserves. States 
have done this primarily by:
• making tax table triggers more sensitive,
• adding or strengthening existing solvency taxes, and 
linking changes and/or levels of benefits to trust fund reserves
The most significant revisions in these features have come from states 
with relatively severe solvency problems. Tables 9.6A and 9.6B dis-
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play the changes since 1980 in selected tax features for fifty-one pro 
grams.
In the past fifteen years, eleven states have raised the fund balance 
triggers that activate the highest tax rate schedule, while either holding 
constant or raising tax rates for the top schedule. This change alone 
means that the state will respond with higher rates on employers at an 
earlier time for a given benefit drawdown. For example, in 1991, Indi 
ana raised the fund balance required to trigger on its highest employer 
tax rate schedule from 0.85 percent of wages to 1.5 percent, making it 
easier to activate that schedule when the balance falls.




Change Responsi Change trigger trigger Change 
Solvency since ve social since (Change since Array since 
























x x - - 
x x x x - x
x
XX - -















































Change Responsi Change trigger trigger 
Solvency since ve social since (Change since Array 
tax 1980 tax 1980 1980) method
X X 






X - - 
X - -






















SOURCE U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service.
NOTE: For trigger change columns, "+" indicates a move to more responsiveness and "-" means 
the opposite. The responsive social tax is an explicit recoupment of noncharges and ineffective 
charges. The array method assigns tax rates to employers ranked by experience factor, such that 
each tax rate applies to an equal amount of taxable wages
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Table 9.6B 1996 Flexible Tax Features (Part 2)
Change Change Change Flexible Change 
Indexed since Flexible since Benefit since employee since 
_________tax base 1980 tax base 1980 ratio 1980 tax 1980
Alabama x x













Illinois x x 
Indiana








Minnesota x x x 
Mississippi x 
Missouri x x 





New Jersey x x 
New Mexico x 
New York
North Carolina x x 
North Dakota x x 
Ohio 
Oklahoma x x
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Change Change Change Flexible Change
Indexed since Flexible since Benefit since employee since
tax base 1980 tax base 1980 ratio 1980 tax 1980
Oregon x
Pennsylvania





















2 2 17 6 3 1
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service
NOTE A flexible tax base is one that increases or decreases with solvency conditions. An indexed
tax base is one that increases with average wages.
The addition or strengthening of an existing solvency tax can have 
the same effect as increasing the sensitivity of a tax table trigger. 
Though states have various names for these taxes, they are primarily 
meant to increase revenues at low levels of trust fund reserves.
As of 1995, twenty-eight states had a solvency tax. Since 1980, 
eleven states added a solvency tax specifically triggered by low trust 
fund levels and designed solely to boost contributions. Most solvency 
tax rates range from 0.1 to 1.0 percent and are levied as additions to 
existing experience-rated tax rates.
Many of the solvency taxes were added as part of more comprehen 
sive law reforms to deal with incidents of insolvency but now remain in 
place and contribute to the eroding degree of countercyclicality of the 
UI system. As an illustration, after having severe solvency problems in 
the early 1980s, Minnesota, in 1988, raised the trigger on its highest 
tax schedule from $80 million to $200 million, effectively activating 
the top schedule sooner in the face of a trust fund drawdown. Further 
more, the state removed a rate limiter that had been in place to prevent 
an employer's rate from increasing or decreasing by more than 2.5 per 
centage points in one year.
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Also added to the Minnesota system was an unusual feature that 
contributes significantly to responsiveness. This is a solvency tax, 
which can change on a quarterly basis, adding 10 percent to scheduled 
tax rates when the trust fund falls below $150 million and 15 percent 
when the fund falls below $75 million.
In addition to solvency taxes, many states add a "social tax" to the 
basic tax rate. These social taxes can have a significant effect on the 
degree of tax responsiveness. During the 1980s, three states joined the 
existing thirteen that had social taxes constructed to specifically recoup 
the dollar amount of the previous year's uncollectible benefit charges, 
i.e., ineffective charges and noncharges. Other states either account for 
social charges indirectly in their tax rate schedules or through solvency 
taxes based on the fund balance. By attempting to account for each dol 
lar of the previous year's total benefits, these sixteen states increase the 
responsiveness of taxes to current outlays. Without this accounting, the 
fluctuating number of employers at the maximum and minimum tax 
rates, which determines a large share of social charges, can cause 
noticeable differences between total benefits paid out and tax revenues. 
In particular, the volume of social charges may cause the tax system to 
respond inadequately during periods of trust fund drawdowns.
Massachusetts has perhaps the most comprehensive computation of 
social charges. The state accounts for each dollar of unattributed bene 
fit costs by adding together noncharged benefits, benefits charged to 
inactive firms, ineffective charges, and dependents' benefits, and then 
subtracting interest earned and the balances of minimum-rated 
employers. A portion of the resulting amount is assigned to each 
employer as a deduction from each one's reserve ratio. In effect, 
employers are credited with lower reserves, resulting in higher taxes.
Part of this trend has also included making levels of benefit pay 
ments to UI claimants contingent on the size of the trust fund. Table 9.7 
provides additional details on this feature and on the trigger mecha 
nism that activates flexible benefits.
Twelve states enacted some form of flexible benefit provision 
between 1983 and 1991, and these features are still present in nine 
states as of 1995. Eleven of the twelve states provided for benefit 
freezes or benefit reductions. 24 All states but Delaware target these 
automatic features on high-wage claimants. Ten states have done this 
through automatic limits on the annual growth in the maximum weekly
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benefit amount (WBA) and/or reductions in the maximum. Three states 
provide for variation in the wage replacement rate, but two of the three 
(Pennsylvania and Wyoming) hold low-wage beneficiaries harmless 
when the reductions are in effect.
Table 9.7 Flexible Benefit Features
Flexible Flexible
First Last replacement maximum Fund Reserve Employer All 
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Table 9.7 (continued)
Flexible Flexible
First Last replacement maximum Fund Reserve Employer All 
_________year year___rate____WBA balance ratio taxes other
New Mexico 
New York
North Carolina 1984 1987 x x 
North Dakota 1991 x x x 
Ohio
Oklahoma 1984 x x 
Oregon







Vermont 1987 x x 
Virginia
Washington 1985 1993 x x 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin
Wyoming 1984 x x
Total_________________3______10____7____3_____4 2 
SOURCE Data taken from U S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service publi 
cations such as "Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws" and from Com 
merce Clearing House summaries of state UI laws
In ten of the twelve states, the trigger for the automatic benefit fea 
ture has been either the absolute level of the state trust fund or the trust 
fund balance measured as a ratio of covered wages (as a ratio of benefit 
payouts in Pennsylvania). Other components of the triggers have been 
almost always related to financing variables, e.g., employer tax rates 
(four states) or outstanding Title XII loans (Vermont). The trigger 
mechanism in three states involves more than a single indicator, with 
the Illinois trigger having three separate components. 25
Unemployment Insurance in the United States 403
Additional Flexibility Features
There exist several other important tax provisions that also act to 
quicken the response of UI taxes and that have increased in number in 
the last fifteen years. Tables 9.6A and 9.6B provide an overview of 
these features. The following elements tend to contribute to the faster 
response of systems:
• Benefit ratio experience rating,
• Indexed taxable wage base, and
• Array method of assigning tax rates
Experience-rating formulas—reserve ratio, benefit ratio, benefit 
wage ratio, and payroll decline—are designed to assess the amount of 
benefit payments attributable to an individual firm and to recoup a por 
tion through the assignment of a yearly tax rate. 26 Several factors in the 
way experience-rating mechanisms have been constructed lead to 
greater responsiveness in some states than in others.
The benefit ratio and benefit wage ratio formulas are considered as 
responding faster because of their shorter memory27 and lack of reserve 
accounting. The crediting of contributions to employer accounts in a 
reserve ratio system actually creates a drag on responsiveness after the 
first year. How much faster benefit ratio systems respond is difficult to 
measure because of the different intervals within tax schedules and the 
varying employer mix in each state. However, taking just a sample of 
states that incurred similar benefit payouts during the last recession, a 
general comparison can be made in the amount of movement by 
employers into and out of the minimum and maximum tax rates for the 
different formulas. The following table helps to illustrate the contrasting 
behavior.
Table 9.8 Comparison of Movement in Distributions of Wages by Tax Rate
Percentage at each tax category
1990 percentage of wages taxed at minimum rate
1993 percentage of wages taxed at minimum rate
1990 percentage of wages taxed at maximum rate













SOURCE. Based on U S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, ES- 
204 reports, section C. Data refer to three reserve ratio states (Arizona, Hawaii, and Rhode Island) 
and three benefit ratio states (Alabama, Maryland, and Virginia)
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In this sample of states, the greatest difference was in the number of 
employers moving away from the minimum rate under the benefit ratio 
as opposed to under the reserve ratio system. Reserve ratio states went 
from an average of 10.3 percent of wages being taxed at the minimum 
rate to 7.8 percent, while the benefit ratio states went from 38.6 percent 
of wages to 25.1 percent. Thus, a much larger share of wages moved to 
higher tax rates in the benefit ratio states than in the reserve ratio states.
The number of employers at the minimum and maximum tax rates is 
an important determinant of the responsiveness of any state system. 
The more firms there are at the minimum and maximum tax rates the 
less responsive the tax system is to benefit shocks, because those 
employers will exhibit less movement in their tax rates. Maximum- 
rated employers will be bounded by the highest tax rate, and minimum- 
rated employers often have large previous balances or low previous 
benefit levels.
In a review of all state tax schedules for rate year 1993, there was an 
average of 4 percent of employers located at the maximum tax rate. 
This ranged from a high of 14 percent in California to a low of less 
than 1 percent in New Hampshire. There was an average of 16 percent 
of employers located at the minimum rate, ranging from a high of 58 
percent in Nevada to less than 1 percent in New Jersey.
In order to avoid the congregation of employers at the minimum and 
maximum tax rates, a few states actually fix the number of employers 
that will receive each rate by ranking employers against each other, 
rather than by setting rates in preassigned intervals. In 1987, North 
Dakota joined six other states in using this type of so-called "array" 
allocation system for employer tax rate determinations. 28 Array alloca 
tion rate setting, which is independent of the type of experience rating 
formula, places a specific percentage of aggregate taxable wages in 
each tax rate interval. This not only allows states to determine total 
contributions more precisely, since the percentage of wages at each tax 
rate is predetermined, but also can be more effective in responding to 
changes in benefit levels.
Possibly the most significant change in state financing laws that 
affects responsiveness in experience rating is a rise in the state taxable 
wage base or indexing the base. Note in table 9.6B that since the 1982 
increase in the federal taxable wage base to $7,000, nine states have 
passed laws to index their wage bases to a proportion of total wages,
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bringing the sum to seventeen indexed states (plus the Virgin Islands). 
Another seventeen states increased their taxable wage base somewhere 
between $500 and $3,800 during this period.
In a benefit ratio state, increasing the taxable wage base extends the 
range of effective experience rating to high-unemployment firms, as 
compared to a state that maintains a much lower base. In a reserve ratio 
state, however, the immediate effect is not as clear and will depend 
more on the distribution of employers along a given state tax schedule. 
For a much higher base, reserve ratio employers will have a tendency 
to move away from the maximum and minimum rates and towards the 
experienced-rated portion of the tax table. However, the higher contri 
butions will also help some employers build up significant balances, 
allowing them to remain in the more unresponsive portions of the tax 
schedule.29
Additionally, six states have had a provision that varies the wage 
base according to the trust fund balance. Of these, two states (see table 
9.6B) currently have such a provision. Since 1985, Missouri has auto 
matically raised its taxable wage base by $500 per year whenever the 
trust fund balance has fallen below $100 million and lowered it by 
$500 per year (but not below $7,000) whenever the balance has 
exceeded $250 million. Between 1992 and 1995, Ohio provided for 
$250 annual increments in its tax base ($8,000 in 1991), but the base 
would have automatically increased to $9,000 if the trust fund had 
fallen below a predetermined threshold. Iowa implemented special 
additions to its indexed tax base in the three years of 1984 to 1986. 
Montana had a similar provision between 1975 and 1977. Hawaii 
experimented with a trigger-activated flexible tax base in the single 
year 1988. The District of Columbia instituted a trigger-activated tax 
base provision in 1995.
All of these provisions, together with several others that are perhaps 
quantitatively less significant, 30 have been adopted during periods of 
insolvency and now remain as features contributing to the faster 
response of UI taxes.
A Comparison of Texas and New York
To better assess how particular features of state laws affect respon- 
siveness, two states were chosen for closer examination. As the follow-
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ing table illustrates, tax revenues in Texas were clearly more 
responsive to benefit increases than were tax revenues in New York 
during and after the 1990-1991 recession.



























































SOURCE U.S. Department of Labor (1992).
Although the recession was mild in Texas, contributions responded 
strongly to the growth in benefits. The first large benefit increase did 
not occur until 1991, when benefits rose by 30 percent, followed by a 
further 17 percent increase in 1992, before declining slightly in 1993. 
Contributions, which had reached a low point in 1991, responded 
quickly, with an increase of 37 percent the first year and 18 percent in 
each of the next two years. The fund balance dropped three years in a 
row but in 1994 started to rise again.
New York, on the other hand, experienced a very large growth in 
benefit outlays during this recession, with the first significant increase 
occurring in 1989. Benefits rose by 28 percent in 1989, 33 percent in 
1990, and 40 percent in 1991. Contributions, however, went down in 
1990. The first significant increase occurred in 1992, three years after 
the beginning of the recession. New York eventually exhausted its 
once-large fund balance and needed cash-flow loans in both 1992 and 
1993.
We compared and contrasted the laws of these two states to see if we 
could identify factors that made their tax systems more or less respon 
sive. Although Texas and New York cannot be compared directly on all 
dimensions of their legislation, three key differences stand out.
First, Texas has a benefit ratio system, and New York has a reserve 
ratio system. A benefit ratio system reflects benefit increases quickly,
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because the employer's experience factor is not affected by current and 
past contributions. Changes in employer experience factors accounted 
for approximately the same average tax rate change in both states dur 
ing this time period, even though the recession was much more severe 
in New York.
Second, Texas explicitly and immediately covers its nonchargeable 
and ineffective charges by reflecting them in the following year's tax 
rates through its "replenishment ratio" and "replenishment tax rate." 
New York has no analogous mechanism.
Third, Texas makes a direct link between the level of its solvency 
surcharge and the amount of contributions needed to restore the fund 
balance to the desired level. New York, in contrast, has a single sol 
vency rate no matter how low the fund balance drops.
Quantitative Analysis of Flexible Financing
This section summarizes our empirical analyses of the quantitative 
importance of flexible financing. Measures of the response of contribu 
tions to increased benefit outflows are derived. One-, two-, and three- 
year response measures are calculated, and changes dating back to the 
early 1950s are documented. Tax responsiveness in 1970 and 1990 is 
then examined for a subset of states that had recessions centered on 
both dates. Regressions also are fitted to estimate possible changes in 
tax responsiveness. Finally, a simulation analysis of flexible financing 
in Pennsylvania is reviewed.
Empirical Tax Responsiveness Measures
Since the preceding section shows that many states have added flex 
ible financing features in recent years, we attempted to test empirically 
whether tax responsiveness has increased quantitatively, particularly in 
the years following the loan policy changes of the early 1980s. An 
important practical difficulty is that the economy has experienced only 
one, fairly mild, recession since 1980-1983 from which to make infer 
ences.
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Using annual data from 1950 through 1994, we first constructed 
empirical measures of tax responsiveness. Recessions were identified 
on a state-by-state basis rather than nationally to account for differen 
tial timing of business cycles across states as well as localized eco 
nomic downturns. Recessionary periods were defined as those in which 
the increase in the benefit cost rate (benefits as a percentage of total 
wages) from the base year to the peak year was 35 percent or greater. 
The beginning year of the recessionary period was identified as the first 
year with a 20 percent increase over the prior year (which then became 
the base year). An additional criterion was to eliminate recessions that 
started within three years of the previous recession, to avoid overlap 
ping of the response measures. The total number of periods meeting 
these criteria was 303, or about 6 per state, with 47 occurring since 
1982.
We then computed one-year, two-year, and three-year tax responses 
for each recessionary period, as follows:
-Q)
one-year response = ——————
two-year response =
three-year response =
((Bt - Bt_i) + (Bt+l - £M ) + (Bt+2 - Bt. } ))
where
C = contributions 
B = benefits, and 
t = first year of recessionary period
There appear to be several difficulties in measuring responsiveness 
accurately. First, benefit cost rates exhibit frequent fluctuations, even in 
nonrecessionary periods; thus, tax rates are never in equilibrium. Sec 
ond, the pattern of benefit increases, e.g., slow buildup versus steep
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increase, has an impact on the measured response, except for the one- 
year measure. For example, for a given cumulative rise in benefits, the 
three-year measure would be higher for a recessionary period in which 
the first year had the largest gain than for a period in which the 
increases started modestly and then gradually became greater. Third, 
using annual data obscures the precise timing of benefit increases.
Probably as a direct result of these assessment problems, the mea 
sured responses exhibited a wide spectrum of values, including many 
outside the expected range of 0.0 to 1.0. In particular, there were many 
negative responses. Assuming that these values were due to the mea 
surement problems that have been discussed, rather than representing 
true responses, the extreme values were eliminated before any analysis 
was done. We included only those recessionary periods for which all 
three measures fell within the range of acceptable values (including 
some negatives for the one-year and two-year measures). This reduced 
the number of recessionary periods to 236, of which 33 occurred since 
1982.
The first analysis examined simple averages of the measures across 
states, without regard to state size or other factors, for three different 
time periods. These averages are shown below.





















Several observations can be made about these averages. First, the 
1952-1968 period has the lowest average responsiveness for all three 
measures. Second, the 1982-1991 period has a clear edge over the 
1969-1981 period only for the three-year measure, even falling slightly 
below it for the two-year measure. Third, the differences in responsive- 
ness are the clearest between the first two time periods, indicating that 
most of the increase in responsiveness over the years occurred in the 
1970s rather than in the 1980s. Finally, the biggest gains in responsive- 
ness over time are in the three-year measure.
The second analysis of the response measures compared the 1990 
recession to the 1970 recession. This comparison was made because
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the 1990 downturn was closer in size to that in 1970 than to the more 
recent recessions. A key difference between the 1970 and 1990 reces 
sions, however, was that aggregate reserves as a percentage of total 
payroll were almost twice as large in 1969 as in 1989 (table 9.1).
Twenty-three states met the various criteria for inclusion in both 
time periods. Responsiveness measures for the two recessions were 
compared for each of those states. Among states for which all three 
response measures were higher in one time period than in the other, 
nine states were more responsive in 1970 than in 1990, and only seven 
states were more responsive in 1990 than in 1970.
An interesting point to note is that the two recessions varied signifi 
cantly in size for many states, which may affect the responsiveness 
comparison. Of the twelve states where there was both a clear differ 
ence in the severity of the two recessions and a clear variation in 
responsiveness, eight states were more responsive in the milder of the 
two recessions.
A third analysis was done by fitting regressions to the data to control 
for factors that might affect the measured responsiveness. The results 
are shown in table 9.10. Three regressions are displayed, using the one- 
year, two-year, and three-year response measures, respectively, as 
dependent variables. The explanatory variables include the reserve 
ratio at the beginning of the recessionary period, the change in the ben 
efit cost rate for each of the recessionary years, and binary variables for 
unmeasured state differences. Time effects were measured with two 
binary variables, one for the period 1969-1992 and one for the period 
1982-1992.
One observation based on the results in table 9.10 is that responsive- 
ness is clearly related to reserve levels, with greater responsiveness at 
lower reserve ratios. The magnitude of the reserve effect does not 
appear to be very large, however, with the impact of a 1 percentage- 
point decline in the reserve ratio ranging from a 3 percentage-point 
increase in the one-year response to a 5 percentage-point increase in 
the three- year response.
A more important observation is that none of the time effects are 
significant. The largest coefficients are, in fact, negative, possibly indi 
cating a reduction in tax responsiveness over time after controlling for 
reserve levels. The conclusion to be drawn from these regressions and 
the other analyses of response measures is that we have been unable to
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show empirically that tax responsiveness has increased since the early 
1980s.


















































NOTE. All regressions include state dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample size is
236
BCR = benefit cost rate
*Significant at the .05 level.
** Significant at the 01 level
Flexible Financing in Pennsylvania
A second type of quantitative analysis was to simulate the impact of 
flexible financing features for a specific state. Pennsylvania enacted UI 
legislation in 1988 designed to increase the automatic responsiveness 
of taxes and benefits, thus reducing the potential need for borrowing 
during recessions. The 1988 law followed earlier solvency legislation 
of 1980 and 1983 and a history of large-scale borrowing from the U.S. 
Treasury. Of the thirty-seven state UI programs that borrowed some 
time during the 1970s and 1980s, Pennsylvania's $5.5 billion total was 
the largest.
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Pennsylvania's 1988 solvency measures provide for additional 
employer taxes, variable employee taxes, and benefit reductions. All 
adjustments to taxes and benefits are activated by a single trigger. The 
trigger is calculated as the ratio of the fund balance at the end of the 
current fiscal year (June 30) to the average benefit outlay for the cur 
rent and the two previous fiscal years, and the ratio is expressed as a 
percentage. Thus a trigger value of 100 indicates that the fund balance 
is equal to one year's worth of benefits.
There are two flexible employer taxes. An employer surcharge is 
imposed as a flat amount that can assume seven different values. Trig 
ger ratios of 150 or larger cause a tax reduction while the largest sur 
charge is levied when the trigger falls below 50. Employers are also 
subject to graduated "additional contributions" when the trigger falls 
below 95. The trigger-activated employee surcharge has a range of pos 
sible values from 0.0 to 0.2 percent of total covered wages. Finally, 
weekly benefits (for claimants paid more than half of the maximum 
WBA) are reduced by 5 percent whenever the trigger ratio falls below 
50. Many of these flexible financing provisions have effects specified 
as fixed dollar amounts. Thus as economic growth occurs, their size 
automatically declines relative to macroeconomic variables such as 
covered employment and total wages.
The impacts of these automatic provisions were studied using a sim 
ulation model that included detailed equations for the determination of 
UI taxes and UI benefits. 31 Model simulations were conducted for the 
years 1991 to 1999. The analysis specified a series of unemployment- 
inflation scenarios and simulated benefits, taxes, and trust fund bal 
ances with the automatic provisions first "off" and then "on." The time 
paths of unemployment reproduced state unemployment from earlier 
periods as well as specifying successively higher unemployment rates. 
Differing inflation rates were also simulated.
Perhaps the most interesting results were yielded by a series of sim 
ulations that successively raised the average total unemployment rate 
by 0.5 percentage point increments. The simulations showed that total 
benefit outlays grew consistently for successive increments but that 
additional taxes reached upper limits, causing the fund balance to 
decline further and cumulative borrowing to increase, despite the pres 
ence of the flexible financing provisions. Even when all provisions
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were fully turned "on," benefit outflows exceeded taxes by wide mar 
gins.
The distribution of worker and employer sacrifices was found to be 
sensitive to the assumed rate of inflation. 32 At low inflation rates, the 
burden of the flexible financing provisions was roughly 50-50, with 
most of the employee burden arising from employee taxes. At higher 
inflation rates, the employee share rose to more than half, with the 
employee taxes accounting for most of the increased employee share. 
This results from the combination of an unlimited tax base for employ 
ees and a limitation on employer taxes caused by the fixed tax base. 
Additional simulations suggested that indexing both the employer tax 
base and the solvency features (rather than using fixed absolute dollar 
amounts) would substantially enhance the effectiveness of flexible 
financing in preventing indebtedness and reducing the scale of insol 
vency.
Three of the principal findings were straightforward. First, the pres 
ence of flexible financing provisions in Pennsylvania reduces the scale 
of borrowing but does not prevent insolvency. Second, the flexible 
financing features were more effective in small downturns than in more 
serious recessions (measured in terms of the increase in the average 
total unemployment rate for 1991-1999). Finally, inflation weakened 
the effectiveness of the flexible financing features in the later years of 
the simulation period.
Implications of Flexible Financing
State Choices
In choosing whether or not to implement a funding strategy that 
relies on a strong element of flexible financing, it is important for a 
state to look at the trade-offs involved. The chief argument in favor of 
flexible financing is that trust fund reserves can be kept low and, at the 
same time, the risk of borrowing can be minimized. The negative 
aspects of large balances have become more widely recognized in 
recent years. First, states may perceive that the opportunity cost of 
holding balances exceeds the interest earnings on reserves. For any
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given level of benefit payouts, a state may prefer to hold smaller trust 
fund balances now than in the past on the argument that the rate of 
return is higher for funds held by employers. 33 Second, large trust fund 
balances may increase pressures for benefit liberalization or for diver 
sions of UI taxes to other purposes. Either use of the trust fund is easier 
to do politically if the fund balance is perceived to be larger than neces 
sary. 34
It is clear that, in the aggregate, states now have smaller desired trust 
fund levels than in the past. Although prerecession balances in 1989 
were high relative to those of the preceding decade, as a percent of 
payroll they were only about half of 1969 balances (table 9.1). This is 
an appropriate comparison because 1969 and 1989 were both at the 
end of long periods of economic growth, presumably allowing reserves 
to be accumulated to desired levels.
A second impetus towards flexible financing is that, even if a state 
chooses to have a low trust fund balance, there are incentives to avoid 
or minimize borrowing. Since 1982, interest has been charged on loans 
(except those repaid the same year they are made). This interest must 
be paid from sources outside the trust fund, either through a separate 
tax or from state general revenues. A further disincentive is the auto 
matic repayment feature of the FUTA tax, which is activated after two 
years of borrowing. This tax repays the loan via a flat surcharge on the 
low federal tax base, rather than through the experience-rated state UI 
tax.
The chief argument against flexible financing is that the timing of 
benefit decreases and tax increases hurts both claimants and employ 
ers. Claimants are faced with reduced benefits at a time when their 
need is the greatest. Businesses are faced with tax increases before they 
have fully recovered from the recession.
Two additional arguments against relying on flexible financing can 
also be noted. First, a state may implement flexible financing features, 
but the provisions may not act with enough strength to prevent insol 
vency. Flexible tax features, for example, simply may not generate suf 
ficient added revenues in a timely manner to counteract the effects of a 
serious recession. Second, there is a question of the presence of enough 
political will to let strong flexible features operate as intended. When 
the time comes, the state executive and/or legislature may decide to 
nullify the automatic response to satisfy preferences of the claimant
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and/or business community. Absent a large trust fund reserve, the result 
could be that the state needs large-scale loans.
National Perspective
While flexible financing may be an attractive option for some states, 
widespread use of flexible financing would be a cause for concern from 
a national economic perspective. The main problem with flexible 
financing from this viewpoint is that it reduces the countercyclical per 
formance of the UI system. One of the original objectives of the UI 
system was to act as an automatic stabilizer of the macro economy, pri 
marily through maintenance of consumer purchasing power. Flexible 
benefit provisions directly reduce this stabilization effect. Taxes that 
respond too quickly also may curtail business spending at the wrong 
time and adversely affect the recovery. The stabilization role of UI is 
already diminished because of the long-term decline in the proportion 
of the unemployed who receive benefits. Increased use of flexible 
financing would further erode this position.
During the 1950s, when UI trust fund balances were much greater, 
there was a good deal of debate and experimentation on ways to make 
tax rates more countercyclical. In the past ten or fifteen years, with rel 
atively low trust fund balances, there has been considerable state legis 
lative movement in the opposite direction, towards quicker recovery of 
benefit costs in the form of flexible financing features. It appears, how 
ever, that the shift towards flexible financing has not been of sufficient 
quantitative importance to have had a significant effect.
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed the history of state UI reserves and bor 
rowing as well as recent trends. A key finding is that states have been 
slow to rebuild their trust funds since the recessionary trough of 1992. 
At the observed fund-building rates of 1993 and 1994, it appears that 
states will enter the next recession with less adequate reserves than 
they had prior to the 1990-1992 recession.
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We have examined flexible financing. As documented, many states 
have added flexible financing features to their UI laws in recent years, 
consistent with the common perception that pay-as-you-go financing 
has increased. We estimated the quantitative effect of flexible financing 
provisions and found that, in the aggregate, the impact of these provi 
sions is rather small.
One finding was common to two separate investigations of flexible 
financing. First, for the twelve states for which responsiveness in both 
the 1970 and 1990 recessions could be compared, eight showed greater 
responsiveness in the milder of the two downturns. Second, in the sim 
ulation analysis of Pennsylvania's 1988 law, its flexible financing fea 
tures were found to be more effective in countering the effects of mild 
recessions. Thus, as currently structured, flexible financing qualities 
may be more effective during mild as opposed to severe downturns. If 
this finding is corroborated by other research, it may point to a need to 
enact solvency taxes and other flexible features that have more "bite" 
than those presently in place. Otherwise, the inadequacy of such mech 
anisms for maintaining solvency would be discovered at the most inap 
propriate time, i.e., during a major recession.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. First, state UI 
trust funds are now more healthy than at the end of the 1970s and start 
of the early 1980s, but they are not so large that the risks of insolvency 
and debt are merely matters of historical interest. The fact that the bor 
rowing during 1990- 1994 was so modest is partly attributable to the 
mild nature of the recession. Second, there is a continuing need for 
states to maintain reserves to avert large-scale borrowing during a 
future slowdown. We note and express concern for the comparatively 
modest pace of trust fund rebuilding during 1993-1994. It appears 
likely that reserves available for the next recession will be less ade 
quate than they were prior to the 1990-1992 recession. Third, while 
flexible financing provisions are now more prevalent and possibly of 
greater significance than they were twenty years ago, our empirical 
results did not suggest that the change has been of large quantitative 
importance. Fourth, the speed and strength of automatic financing 
responses appear inadequate to the needs that would arise in a future 
downturn if its depth and severity equaled the average of the eight post- 
World War II recessions.
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NOTES
Any opinions expressed in this chapter are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the positions of the U.S. Department of Labor or the Urban Institute
1 See chapter 12 in Haber and Murray (1966).
2 The term "net reserves" refers to total state reserves less outstanding loans from the U.S. 
Treasury at the end of the indicated years. The term "aggregate payrolls" refers to taxable employ- 
ets only and does not reflect employers who finance benefit payments on a reimbursable basis.
3 Connecticut and New York also borrowed small amounts during the first six months of 
1995 The definition of a "large" loan, as the term is used in this chapter, is given shortly.
4 Thus, table 9.1 shows reserve ratios for the entire United States for nine individual years
5. Two criticisms are frequently made First, the highest cost period is often so far in the past, 
e g., January-December 1964 for South Dakota, that it may no longer be relevant as an indicator 
of risk Second, because the multiple is a static concept, it does not adequately recognize the 
dynamic response of taxes when trust funds are being depleted A fast response of taxes can allow 
a state to function successfully with a lower trust fund reserve. The validity of the second argu 
ment motivates this chapter.
6. See chapters 2 and 5 and appendix E in Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 
(1995)
7. The recommendations are numbers 2-6 in chapter 2 of the Advisory Council on Unemploy 
ment Compensation report Several of the ACUC recommendations for providing financial 
rewards to states that build large reserves previously appeared in a book by one of the authors. See 
chapter 6, pages 145-146, in Vroman (1990)
8 Table 9.2 displays similar information to that previously displayed in table 9.1, but for a 
shorter time period and with attention to state-level as well as to aggregate detail
9 The single years within each period used as the numerieres for the borrowing totals were 
respectively 1975, 1984, and 1991
10 Regression analysis of the probability of a state needing a loan during a recession consis 
tently shows a negative and highly significant coefficient on the prerecession HCM
11 Clearly, the passage of a longer period of time can affect cumulative measures of borrow 
ing activities. However, of the 31 programs that needed loans between 1980 and 1987, twenty- 
nine borrowed between 1980 and 1983 Because the 1980-1987 borrowing was heavily concen 
trated early in that time span, the 1980-1987 and 1990-1994 periods are more comparable than 
might initially be imagined
12 There are other conditions for interest avoidance, e.g , no borrowing between October 1 
and December 31 Also, if a states does owe interest, repayment of these financing charges can be 
deferred for up to 15 months following the September 30 due date, with additional interest accru 
ing on the unpaid balance.
13 Debt repayment behavior also changed as a result of the Social Security Amendments of 
1983 that gave debtor states strong financial incentives to improve solvency and repay debt 
through a combination of benefit reductions and tax increases Three distinct financial incentives 
were offered deferred payment of interest, lower interest rates, and reduced FUTA penalty taxes.
14. One summary of the changes in state repayment patterns dunng the 1980s is given in 
chapter 1, tables 1.5 and 1.6, of Vroman (1990)
15 Specific details of the benefit reductions enacted by states with the biggest financing prob 
lems in the early 1980s are provided in chapter 2 of Vroman (1986)
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16. The concentration of reserve losses among a few big states is not unique to the 1990-1992 
downturn During the recession of the early 1980s, four large industrial states (illmois, Michigan, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania) accounted for about 80 percent of total borrowing.
17. A partial list would include. (1) state legislative actions to improve solvency, (2) automatic 
changes in taxes and benefit payments activated by reductions in trust fund balances, and (3) the 
size and persistence of the increase in unemployment (a proxy for the depth of the recession in the 
state).
18. The recession might be characterized as bicoastal simply because California is so large 
relative to other states on the West Coast Note in table 9.4B that for the other four states in the 
Pacific division the ratio of unemployment rates ranges from low to high as follows- Washington 
(0.937), Alaska (1,005), Hawaii (1.058), and Oregon (1 070) None of these four states had its 
unemployment rate ratio increase by even half of the national average increase.
19 The other four are California, Mississippi, Missoun, and Nevada.
20 Because the recent recession was comparatively mild, it should be kept in mind that larger 
reductions in HCMs would take place during a more serious downturn.
21. Note in the bottom panel of table 9.5 that ten states increased their HCMs during the 1979- 
1983 period. While we have not attempted to explain this pattern, it should be observed that sev 
eral states with low and negative balances enacted solvency legislation during 1982 and 1983 with 
the specific objective of reducing indebtedness State-level legislation contributed to these 
increases in reserves.
22. EUC benefits exceeded $250 million in every month between December 1991 and April 
1994 Payments exceeded $1.0 billion in eighteen of these twenty-nine months. During 1992 and 
1993, annual EUC benefits totaled more than half of regular UI benefits.
23 Connecticut was the only state to finance its 1991-1994 borrowing with state-issued 
bonds. The state's motivation was to save on interest costs since state debt is tax-free ,and interest 
rates are lower than for U S Treasury debt. During the mid-1980s, Louisiana and West Virginia 
also used this method to repay Title XII debts. See Vroman (1993) for an analysis of state bond 
issuance and a comparison with traditional borrowing from the U.S. Treasury
24. Minnesota provides for a higher maximum benefit amount when the trust fund balance 
falls. Thus, its flexible benefit provision is not a flexible financing provision -in the sense that it 
does not contribute to trust fund solvency.
25. The three elements of the Illinois trigger mechanism are the level of the trust fund, average 
employer tax rates, and the growth in first payments.
26. Experience-rating systems are of two general types, stock-based and flow-based Stock- 
based systems (reserve ratio systems) use the employer's account balance (measured relative to 
either total or taxable payrolls) to gauge experience and to set individual employer tax rates. 
Flow-based systems 9benefit ratio, benefit wage ratio, and payroll decline systems) use measures 
of benefit payouts and/or payrolls of liable employers to set individual employer tax rates In both 
types of systems, the indicator of experience causes taxes to increase following recession-related 
benefit payouts.
27 Reserve ratio calculations take into account the entire experience (contributions minus 
benefits charged) since the employer was in existence, while benefit ratio formulation uses only 
the last three years of benefits.
28. The other states are Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Vermont, and Washington.
29. How much the size of the tax base affects responsiveness depends also on the number of 
payroll years that reserve ratio and benefit ratio states use to measure their experience rate. Inter 
estingly, adding years to the denominator of the reserve ratio will increase responsiveness, while 
the opposite is true for a benefit ratio calculation. During recessions, taxable payroll for some 
employers decreases quickly, pushing the reserve ratio up and thus causing a lowering of the tax
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rate. In a benefit ratio calculation, the declining wages tend to increase the tax rate on employers 
Previously, six states used only the last year of taxable wages in the denominator of the reserve 
ratio calculation This number had declined to three states in 1995: Massachusetts, South Caro 
lina, and Wisconsin
30. Among these are a short lag between computation date and effective date of new tax rates, 
narrow intervals between tax schedule triggers and between tax rate triggers within schedules, 
trust-fund-activated employee taxes, not crediting solvency taxes to employer reserve accounts, 
and not limiting year-to-year rate or schedule changes.
31 See Worden and Vroman (1991). Appendix A of their paper shows the model's equations.
32 Worker sacrifices have two components: increased employee taxes and reduced benefits to 
claimants
33. We do not-know of research to formalize the rates of return calculations that support argu 
ments for maintaining funds with employers as opposed to holding reserves in trust funds. Cer 
tainly, arguments to lower taxes on employers would be weakened if trust fund reserves were 
invested in assets with higher rates of return than U.S. government debt
34 Again, rhetoric and casual observation provide much of the basis for this assertion It 
would be useful to investigate the issue within a formal statistical (regression) framework
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